I
There are many varieties of functionalism currently being defended and criticized, but the central doctrine binding these theories together can be put quite simply: mental states are to be individuated in terms of the abstract causal roles they play. This thesis is as important for what it denies as for what it asserts. It denies that to be in a certain type of mental state is to be in any type of physical state. It denies that to be in a certain type of mental state is to be disposed to behave in a certain way.
Both the mindbrain identity theory and behaviorism are false on this theory, and for basically the same reason. Mental states are abstract in the sense that they are neutral with regard to the substance of the minds that have them.
A mental state need not be realized by a brain state and a mind need not be embedded in a human body. The whole ontological issue of brain, soul or neutral substance is bypassed in favor of a characterization of the conditions which must be satisfied by any possible substance realizing mental properties. This feature of functionalism was inspired largely by the desire to assimilate the insights arising out of recent work in artificial intelligence.
What makes the activities of some computers so strikingly similar to human behavior is not the nuts and bolts of the physical machine but the program it executes. Since the same program can be executed by physically disparate computing machines, a certain type of physical structure cannot be essential to its operation. This negative insight of functionalism is its least controversial feature, although we will see reason to doubt it.
On the positive side functionalists typically explicate the notion of an abstract causal role in terms of the causal relations a mental state bears to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and predecessor and successor states internal to the system. Every mental state is thus implicitly defined in terms of its relations to other mental states and to its internal and external environment. The goal of functionalism can be seen as the elimination of the rough and ready mentalistic vocabulary of common sense psychology in favor of the formally precise language of the kind found in computer programming.
The special difficulty that functionalist theories face with the qualitative character of sensations can now be put plainly. The functionalist program is to define mental states relationally, but I will argue that some mental states appear to have intrinsic properties. The felt phenomenological quality of the rich taste of strawberry shortcake or the feel of skin against fine fur are not plausibly construed as purely relational properties.
Furthermore, the qualitative character of a sensation is often crucial to determining the kind of mental state that it is. Could anything be a pain if it felt good, or looked yellow or had no qualitative character at all?
At this point the functionalist may well respond that intuitions are easy to manipulate, particularly when the question is framed in such a rhetorical manner.
Accordingly, it will be worthwhile to look at a couple of arguments which may provide a firmer guide to intuition. Perhaps what feels like a burn to me feels like an ache or a cut to him.
II
Once the possibility is admitted for colors there seems to be no way to prevent it from undermining our faith in other minds generally.
The temptation to deny the logical possibility of spectrum inversion has often proved irresistable, and subtle arguments have been advanced to show that the idea is incoherent.* I will not take the time to examine these arguments because I don't think it is necessary.
Instead, consider for a moment the possibility of intra-subjective spectrum inversion. You wake up tomorrow morning and things which looked red yesterday look green to you today. This change would be detectable.
You would probably complain loudly about this unwelcome turn of events. Nor could your complaints be put down to some sort of linguistic confusion since it could easily show up in your behavior as well. You might drive through flashing red lights for example.
If it is at least logically possible that this could happen to a person at some time in his life, then what contradiction would be generated by supposing that he has been in this condition his entire life; or that he develops a case of amnesia shortly after his experience of spectum inversion?
A second line of argument open to defenders of functionalism would be to claim that, although the situation described is logically possible, it is nomologically impossible for functionally identical psychological states to differ in their qualitative character.* Perhaps there is a mapping which preserves the smooth transitions from one color to another, but the burden of proof would seem to be upon proponents of the argument to show that there is a mapping with the required properties. Although I think that logical possibility is all the inverted qualia argument strictly requires, it is important to recognize that this objection to the argument often expresses the feeling that fanciful thought-experiments carry little weight in the face of an attractive theory. All sorts of extravagant circumstances may be imagined, but in the absence of any relevant empirical data a theory should be judged by its actual successes and failures.
This attitude is understandable but nevertheless misguided. The case is described in the extreme form of fully inverted spectra in order to make vivid the failure of functionalism to capture a salient aspect of our mental life. The disadvantage of such a theory is, of course, that it leaves the predicate "has qualitative character" undefined.
We are now in a position to provide a partial answer to the skeptical doubts the inverted qualia argument inspires. The first point to notice is that it is not true that no possible evidence could bear upon the truth of this hypothesis.
In the case of intrasubjective spectrum inversion the most natural explanation of the situation would be that the neural mechanism which formerly took objective red into subjective red now takes objective red into subjective blue. A fancy brain scan could confirm the hypothesis which then could be used to test for inter-subjective specturm inversion. We will have occasion to return to the suggestion that the realization of a functional theory is the proper level of description for qualitative states, but it may be objected at this point that evidence which is not currently available can hardly explain our confidence in ascribing mental states to other people. Part of the answer to this objection can be found in the functionalist theory just sketched. The fact that other people exhibit similar behavioral responses to color stimulation is evidence for an isomorphism between quality space matrices. Whatever may be the intrinsic character of the sensations of other people, we at least know that their sensations are systematically related in a way which mirrors the relations which hold in our own case. This objection misconstrues the point of the original argument. Clearly, qualitative states do play a prominent role in our mental lives, but this role, as the functionalist has defined it, could very well be filled by some other mechanism wholly lacking in qualitative character. Both the absent qualia argument and the inverted qualia argument can be seen as making the same point, i.e., that functionalism neglects some of the causal consequences of the normal operation of the system and some of these consequences may well be relevant to how a specific realization of the functional theory fills the abstract role in question. For example, a functionalist theory of the generation of electricity may well be neutral with respect to whether the electricity is generated by a hydroelectric or by a nuclear process. However, the use of uranium as opposed to water can have dramatic causal consequences which would not be captured by this functionalist account.
Likewise, in making the notion of abstract causal role constitutive of mental states, functionalism has pitched its analysis at too abstract a level. A theory of abstract causal roles by its very nature selects from among the causal consequences of a process those consequences which are relevant to the succession of states.
A psychological theory which brought into clear focus the perceptual mechanisms employed by known sentient creatures would nicely complement the abstract functionalism we have been discussing.
Fortunately, a thriving model for such a theory can be found in functional explanation in biology. The patterns of explanation found in evolutionary biology suitably adapted to the subject matter of psychology, could supply a much needed element of empirical content to the formal structure of abstract functionalism.
I will now briefly state what I take to be the principal components* of functional explanation in biology and also indicate how this explanatory framework can be brought to bear upon the issue at hand.
(1) For the purposes of functional explanation, only causal consequences need be considered, but since our metaphysics presupposes an ontology of individuals, it will be more natural to speak of an item and what it does.
The point to notice here is that more than one item can engage in the same activity.
If two or more items have the same causal consequences they are said to be functionally equivalent. This aspect of functional explanation in biology is similar to the negative insight of abstract functionalism discussed earlier, although it should be noted that the constraints placed upon functional equivalence are much stronger here. (2) In system S the causal consequences of an activity must be computed within the context of the containing system, if any. The competing demands of other components in an instantiated system will often force tradeoffs in efficiency. Optimal design for any component of a system cannot be assumed. (3) Relative to enrironment E the interaction of the system with the outside world must be factored into the derivation of causal consequences.
Since a system needs to deploy its resources as efficiently as possible, the demands placed upon it by the environment will shape the configuration of its component parts. (4) Relative to purpose P not all the consequences of an activity will be functional within the system. The function of the heart, for example, is to circulate the blood, but the activity of the heart also has nonfunctional consequences (heart sounds) and dysfunctional consequences (heart attacks). The introduction of a purpose provides a device for distinguishing between the function of an item and its other causal consequences.
The use of teleological language need not involve an appeal to consciousness, entelechies, vital processes or anything of the sort. All that the use of "purpose" entails is that the system is the product of a selection mechanism of some kind.
In biology this role is played by natural selection and if natural selection can be reduced without explanatory loss to the operation of mechanistic forces than talk of purposes will be in a sense eliminable.
In any case, the use of purpose-laden language is both indispensible as a practical matter and oritologically harmless if relativized to some fully causal selection process.
A functionalism guided by the biological model of explanation will take as its proper object some particular system or kind of system. One would expect naturally evolved systems such as human beings to have roughly the kind of mental states they ought to have given their epistemic needs, the demands of the environment and the cognitive resources at their disposal. Broadly speaking, the purposes served by sensations are to allow the system to extract information about how the world is impinging upon its body and about the present state of equilibrium in its body. But it is not enough merely to extract the information. The information must be presented to the relevant subsystem in a form in which it can be sorted, processed and used.
Any information flow requires some channel through which it is represented. Information just is the structuring of some channel. Now, the flow of information can be studied from two quite different perspectives.
One may concentrate on the amount and type of information to which the system has access and the ways in which the information is utilized and affects the succession of internal states. This is the project which abstract functionalism is best suited to handle. Or, one may focus upon the properties of the channel in which information is embedded. This is the domain of the more concrete functionalism we are now considering. Abstract functionalism will impose some constraints on the character of the channel.
The channel must be relatively free from noise and equivocation for example.
It must be a clear channel 9 in the sense that the channel either adds no new information or adds only redundant information. Beyond this it is necessary to look at the specific mechanism which carries the information and the broad systemic constraints imposed upon it. One possibility in the case of sensations is to view the qualitative character of sensations as the encoding channel through which the encoded information is presented to consciousness.
10
The distinctive character of each sensory modality could be attributed to the character of the channel in which the relevant information was embedded. The distinctive character of a given sensation would in turn be explained in terms of the encoding principles of the channel in question. In the case of pain the categories of throbbing, cutting, aching and burning together with various levels of intensity and shading between pure types could serve as channel conditions through which information is transmitted. Clearly, much more would need to be said before this suggestion could be fairly evaluated, but being programmatic is not in itself a defect.
If a proposal is free from conceptual confusion and promises to uncover heretofore hidden relationships then it is worthy of careful attention. tion which no mere theory can perform. 
